Understanding South Africa's Economic Puzzles by Dani Rodrik
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








This paper was prepared for the Harvard University Center for International Development Project
on South Africa. I have greatly benefited from the guidance and insights of Trevor Manuel, Alan Hirsch,
Lesetja Kganyago, and Ismail Momoniat. I also thank Philippe Aghion, Abhijit Banerjee, Ricardo
Caballero, Johannes Fedderke, Jeffrey Frankel, Sebastian Galiani, Ricardo Hausmann, Laurence Harris,
Dave Kaplan, Robert Lawrence, Jim Levinson, James Robinson, Ben Smit, Chris Stone, Federico
Sturzenegger, and Lynne Thomas for feedback and discussion on the ideas presented here.  Oeindrila
Dube and Robert Mitchell provided research assistance.
 The views expressed herein are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2006 by Dani Rodrik. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Understanding South Africa's Economic Puzzles
Dani Rodrik




South Africa has undergone a remarkable transformation since its democratic transition in 1994, but
economic growth and employment generation have been disappointing.  Most worryingly, unemployment
is currently among the highest in the world. While the proximate cause of high unemployment is that
prevailing wages levels are too high, the deeper cause lies elsewhere, and is intimately connected to
the inability of the South African to generate much growth momentum in the past decade.  High unemployment
and low growth are both ultimately the result of the shrinkage of the non-mineral tradable sector since
the early 1990s.  The weakness in particular of export-oriented manufacturing has deprived South
Africa from growth opportunities as well as from job creation at the relatively low end of the skill
distribution.  Econometric analysis identifies the decline in the relative profitability of manufacturing
in the 1990s as the most important contributor to the lack of vitality in that sector.
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  The transformation that South Africa has undergone since its democratic transition in 
1994 is nothing short of remarkable.  Prior to 1994, the South African economy and polity were 
dominated by the white minority, and even though the Apartheid regime had begun to unravel in 
the 1980s, the majority blacks remained deprived of basic political and economic freedoms.  
Given the depth of the racial and income divides that prevailed, it would not have been 
unreasonable to predict a cycle of redistribution and macroeconomic populism following 
democratization that would wreak havoc with the economy and turn the country into a sham 
democracy.   
Instead, the democratically elected governments led by the African National Congress 
(ANC) have managed to create a stable, peaceful, and racially balanced political regime with an 
exemplary record of civil liberties and political freedoms.  Economic policy has been conducted 
in an equally exemplary manner, with South Africa turning itself into one of the emerging 
markets with the lowest risk spreads.  While South Africa has instituted some innovative (and 
expensive) social transfer programs to address long-standing disparities, it has done so in the 
context of cautious fiscal and monetary policies which have kept inflation and public debt at low 
levels.  There were no nationalizations or large-scale asset redistributions. Moreover, the 
economy was opened to international trade and capital flows.
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1 See Hirsch (2005) for an excellent account by an insider.  Other perspectives on South African growth 
performance include Fedderke (2002), Hartzenberg and Stuart (2002), and du Plessis and Smit (2006).  Two recent 
collections, with very different perspectives on economic growth, are Nowak and Ricci (2005) and Pollin et al. 
(2006).   2
If the world were fair, political restraint and economic rectitude of this magnitude would 
have produced a booming South African economy operating at or near full employment.  
Unfortunately, it has not turned out that way.  In the decade since 1994, per-capita GDP grew at 
an average rate of 1.2 percent per annum—a rate that is comparable to that of sub-Saharan Africa 
(1.1 percent) and Latin America (0.8 percent), and considerably below that of South Asia (3.7 
percent) and East Asia (6.2 percent).  As Figure 1 shows, South Africa’s income level has yet to 
catch up with its peak level attained in 1980.  And investment remains low at around 17 percent 
of GDP (although the bulk of the overall decline in the investment effort since 1970s is due to 
the reduction in public investment).   
The most worrying aspect of this disappointing economic performance is unemployment.  
South Africa’s unemployment rate today stands at 26 percent according to the narrower 
definition of who is unemployed, and at 40 percent if one includes discouraged workers 
(Banerjee et al., 2006).  This is one of the highest rates of unemployment anywhere in the world 
(see Figure 2 for some international comparisons).  Furthermore, unemployment appears to have 
increased particularly rapidly since the democratic transition (from a “low” of 13 percent in 
1993).  (The lack of labor force surveys makes it difficult to know what the comparable 
unemployment rates were in the 1980s.)  As would be expected, unemployment is heavily 
concentrated among the young, unskilled, and the black population. This poor record on 
employment represents not only an economic tragedy, it poses a significant threat to the stability 
and eventual health of the South African democracy.   
The proximate cause of high unemployment is that prevailing South African wages are 
too high compared to real wage levels that would clear labor markets at lower levels of 
unemployment.  Trade unions and wage bargaining play an important role in wage determination   3
in South Africa. The trade union confederation COSATU (Congress of South African Trade 
Unions) is a partner in the governing coalition dominated by the ANC.  A cursory comparison of 
wages across countries would show that South African wages (in the formal sector) are quite 
high by the standards of countries at similar income levels.  On the other hand, real wages have 
not risen much (if at all) since the transition to democracy (Leibbrandt et al. 2005), and to the 
extent that unions have prevailed, it seems to have been mostly to prevent the real wages of their 
members from falling (Banerjee et al. 2006).  The evidence I will show later in the paper 
suggests that wage-push has not been a significant factor in determining patterns of structural 
change in the South African economy during the 1990s. 
The deeper cause of South African unemployment lies elsewhere, and it is intimately 
connected to the inability of the South African to generate much growth momentum in the past 
decade.  High unemployment and low growth are both ultimately the result of the shrinkage of 
the non-mineral tradable sector since the early 1990s.  The weakness in particular of export-
oriented manufacturing has deprived South Africa from growth opportunities that other countries 
have been able to avail themselves of.  The point is perhaps best made by comparing South 
Africa to a high-growth economy such as Malaysia, a country with which South Africa shared 
many common features in the 1980s.  As I will show in the next section, the main difference 
between these two countries is that Malaysia was able to pull an increasing share of its workforce 
into manufacturing—the sector with the highest labor productivity in the economy—while in 
South Africa manufacturing lost ground to the tertiary sector. 
The reason that this pattern of structural change is also a key driver of unemployment is 
that in South Africa non-mineral tradables (including manufacturing) are intensive in low skilled 
labor compared to services.  The relative shrinkage of manufacturing (along with economy-wide   4
skill upgrading) has entailed a collapse in demand for relatively unskilled workers.  This need 
not have turned into a growing unemployment problem among the unskilled if one or both of two 
things could have happened.  First, a large enough decline in real wages at the low end of the 
skill distribution could have compensated for the inward shift of the labor demand schedule.  But 
this was an unrealistic option in view of the social expectations and political realities created by 
the democratic transition.  Second, the growing mass of job seekers could have been absorbed 
into the informal sector (where wages and work conditions are considerably more flexible).  This 
second mechanism is how developing countries elsewhere have coped with similar labor market 
problems.  But while informal employment has grown rapidly in South Africa, its level remains 
quite low by the standards of developing countries (see Table 2 below).  This is no doubt one of 
the legacies of the Apartheid regime—which made it first illegal and then difficult for blacks to 
move to larger urban areas unless they already had a certified job.  In the absence of sufficient 
real wage adjustment and informal sector growth, the decline in the demand for low skilled 
workers has resulted in high unemployment.
2 
A key implication follows from this diagnosis: expansion of non-mineral tradables—
manufacturing in particular—will be good both for growth and employment.  An export oriented 
strategy that increases the relative profitability of producing tradables for world markets will 
generate economic growth by pulling labor into productive activities where their marginal 
product is much higher.  And since tradables are relatively low-skill intensive in South Africa 
compared to service activities that have been the major beneficiary of recent patterns of 
structural change, such a strategy will entail shared growth rather than trickle-down growth.  The 
cures for low growth and high unemployment are largely one and the same.   
                                                 
2 One needs to add the impact of rising female labor participation in the 1990s as well (Leibbrandt et al. 2005).  
Overall labor force participation still seems low in South Africa, however, by international benchmarks.     5
 The plan of this paper is as follows. In section II, I provide a brief comparison with 
Malaysia to underscore the central role played by export-oriented manufacturing in Malaysia’s 
growth performance.  In section III, I turn to employment and examine the patterns of structural 
change that account for the decline in the demand for labor (especially low skill labor). In section 
IV, I provide an econometric analysis of the patterns of structural change to better pinpoint their 
sources.  The econometrics identifies the decline in the relative profitability of manufacturing in 
the 1990s as the most important contributor to the lack of vitality in that sector.  Section V 
concludes. 
 
II. Why is South Africa not Malaysia? 
  The title of this section is not as crazy as it may sound at first.  South Africa and Malaysia 
are both medium-sized economies with deep racial cleavages, in which an ethnic majority 
controls the polity but economic power lies with an ethnic minority.  Table 1 shows some 
comparisons using the Hall and Jones (1999) database for 1988.  As the table reveals, the 
economic structures of the two economies were strikingly similar at that time.  Output per head 
and TFP were virtually identical—roughly at a quarter and a half of the U.S. level, respectively.  
Human capital levels were also quite close. And both economies had a similar dependence on 
mining.     
  But this snapshot hides important differences in the evolution of the structure of the two 
economies.  Most importantly, Malaysia was undergoing a process of industrialization, while 
South Africa had begun to de-industrialize.  Figure 3, which shows the trends in the share of the 
labor force employed in manufacturing in the two economies, tells a striking story.  As of the 
mid-1980s, South Africa still had a larger manufacturing base: Roughly 12 percent of its total   6
labor force was employed in manufacturing, compared to less than 8 percent in Malaysia.  But 
since then, Malaysia has industrialized by leaps and bounds, with this number reaching 16 
percent a decade later. In South Africa, by contrast, the proportion of the workforce employed in 
manufacturing has come steadily down, to below 7 percent by 2000.  What is also remarkable in 
Malaysia’s experience is that this pick-up in industrialization came after a period of what looked 
like a continuous decline in manufacturing in the early 1980s.  The latter suggests that it is 
possible to reverse a trend deterioration in manufacturing performance, provided the policy 
framework is adequate (on which more later). 
  The expansion of manufacturing in Malaysia has been both growth and equity promoting.  
It has been good for growth, because as Figure 4 shows, manufacturing is the sector where labor 
is the most productive by far. Even if the productivity differences are smaller at the margin than 
on average, there are still large unexploited gains from moving labor into manufacturing from 
other activities.  And it was equity promoting because much of the gains from this process of 
structural change accrued to the workers themselves.   
  If the South African economic structure moved in the opposite direction, it is not because 
manufacturing did not enjoy similar advantages in South Africa.  While South African 
manufacturing appears not as productive as that of Malaysia, it still remains more productive 
than South African services (Figure 4).  Why South Africa de-industrialized prematurely is 
therefore an important question, and one that I will analyze econometrically in section IV. 
  Manufactures are the quintessential tradables, and the different roads traveled by the two 
economies are perhaps most evident in their trade performance.  Once again, the two economies 
started out in roughly similar positions. Around the mid-1970s, the share of manufactured 
exports in GDP stood at around 6-7 percent in both countries.  By 2004, this figure had in   7
creased to more than 80 percent in Malaysia, but only to 12 percent in South Africa. And as 
Malaysia developed its manufacturing base, it caught up with and surpassed South Africa in 
terms of the “sophistication” of its export basket (Figure 5).    
  There are of course a multitude of reasons that account for the different paths taken by 
the two economies.  Malaysia was in a different neighborhood, one that was considerably 
friendlier to an export-oriented strategy. South Africa had to contend with the debilitating effects 
of the trade embargo it faced in world markets in the 1980s and its heavy spending on defense 
industries for the purpose of propping up the Apartheid regime.  But one should not minimize the 
active role played by government to promote manufacturing (and manufactured exports) in 
Malaysia.  Even though industrial policies went through various phases (for a summary, see Box 
1), expanding and diversifying the industrial base of the economy remained an unwavering goal.  
Policies employed a mix of market signals and direct incentives through tax, trade, and labor-
market interventions.  Some of the industries spawned by these interventions have been failures 
(such as the national auto manufacturer, Proton, launched in the early to mid-1980s), but the 
successes (in electronics, for example) have been more than adequate to pay for these failures.  
Malaysia’s experience is in line with other successful industrializers’.  The productive 
diversification that economic growth requires is not an automatic process that well-functioning 
markets generate on their own; it requires an experimental, nurturing approach by the 
government in strategic collaboration with the private sector (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003, 
Rodrik 2004).             8
III. Patterns of employment and structural change in South Africa 
  Formal employment in South Africa has stagnated during the 1990s, despite the pick-up 
in economic growth since 1994 and the increase in labor force participation associated with 
democratization and the end of the Apartheid era (Figure 6).  Semi- and low-skilled workers still 
constitute around 42 percent of those employed in the formal sector.
3   
The constancy of overall employment masks a tremendous structural change that has 
taken place within the economy over the last two decades or so.  This can be seen in Figure 7, 
where I show the shares in total employment of three different types of economic activities: 
tradable activities (mining, agriculture, and manufacturing); private non-tradable activities 
(financial services, construction, trade, retail, transport, and other services); and public non-
tradable activities (utilities and government services).  The figure shows a dramatic increase in 
the employment share of private non-tradables at the expense of tradables.  The latter have come 
down from more than 40 percent of employment in the late 1970s to around 30 percent currently.  
What this reflects is a decline in agricultural and mining employment which has not been 
compensated by an increase in manufacturing employment.  Among expanding sectors, financial 
intermediation, insurance, real estate and business services (F.I.R.E., SIC 8) have been 
particularly notable.  That sector now employs as many workers as all of manufacturing taken 
together (around 15 percent of total formal employment).  
This pattern of structural change implies a significant decline in the relative demand for 
low skill labor because the declining sectors constitute the least skill intensive parts of the South 
African economy.  The skill intensity of the three sectors is shown in Figure 8, which displays 
the shares of low and skilled workers in sectoral employment.  First, what is evident in the graph 
                                                 
3 All data in this section, including the classification of workers by skill category come from the Quantec database, 
accessed through the TIPS (Trade and Industrial Policy Secretariat) website.   9
is that there has been across-the board skill upgrading in the economy, with the low-skilled share 
falling in all three sectors.  Second, and more importantly, tradable sectors remain the most low-
skill intensive part of the economy by far.  As late as 2004, more than 70 percent of workers 
employed in tradable industries were classified as “low and unskilled” workers.  The 
corresponding figure in private non-tradables was only 25 percent.  Even if we exclude mining 
and agriculture from tradables and focus on manufactures, there remains a big gap: slightly less 
than 60 percent of workers employed in manufacturing in 2004 were classified as low and 
unskilled. 
The negative relationship between low-skill intensity and employment growth shows up 
also at finer levels of disaggregation.  Figure 9 shows the pattern of structural change within 
manufacturing.  The simple correlation between the initial share of semi- and unskilled workers 
and the subsequent increase in employment for the 28 subsectors within manufacturing  is -0.41.  
This pattern of structural change helps explain the persistent concern in South African 
business and policy circles with a “skills shortage.”  The view that skills acts as a significant 
constraint on economic growth is widely held, and is reflected in the government’s official 
policy document on the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGI-SA).  
It is natural that a pattern of growth that has (thus far) emphasized the expansion of skill-
intensive tertiary sectors at the expense of low-skill intensive tradable sectors puts a premium on 
skills and human capital.  On the other hand, if it is true, as I have argued, that higher levels of 
growth and employment creation require a different pattern of structural change—an expansion 
of low-skill intensive manufactures at the expense of skill-intensive non-tradables—skills can no 
longer be viewed as a serious constraint on future growth.  In view of the patterns of skill   10
intensity discussed earlier, manufactures-led growth would on balance reduce the relative 
demand for skilled workers.   
A final trend worth emphasizing is capital deepening.  The process of substituting capital 
for labor has been particularly marked in tradable activities (including manufacturing).  
Interestingly, this trend is confined to tradables: capital-labor ratios have remained more or less 
constant within the (private) non-tradable sector (Figure 10).  The result is that tradable activities 
now employ considerably higher capital per worker than non-tradable activities.     
To sum up, we have identified three important trends in the economy which together 
have put a significant damper on the demand for low skilled workers in South Africa.  First, 
there has been substitution towards skilled workers within each economic activity.  Second, there 
has been significant structural change away from the most low-skill intensive parts of the 
economy, namely tradables.  Third, within tradables, production techniques have become 
progressively more capital-intensive.   The first and third of these trends probably have a lot to 
do with ongoing patterns of technological change.  Skill-biased technological change, in 
particular, has been a common feature of all open economies during the last two decades or so.  
But the reasons for the second trend are unclear, and since the structural shift against tradables 
relates closely to determinants of growth in South Africa, these reasons will be analyzed in the 
next section of the paper.   
These shifts in the demand for labor (particularly low-skill labor) make it easier to 
understand why unemployment has trended up and is so high in South Africa.  Of course, a 
rising unemployment could perhaps have been avoided by a commensurate decline in real wages 
for low-skilled workers.  But this would have been a political impossibility in view of the 
democratic transformation in South Africa and the role played by unions in the anti-Apartheid   11
struggle and the new democratic government.  That is not to say that unemployment is itself 
without political cost.  But the relatively generous social grants put in place by the democratic 
government has apparently taken the edge off what would have otherwise been a very serious 
social problem.  There is some evidence that households view paid employment and social grants 
as substitutes at the margin. For example, households that lose a pension-eligible member 
subsequently report increased labor force participation (Rancchod 2006, as reported in Banerjee 
et al. 2006; see also Bertrand et al. 2003). 
As discussed in the introduction, unemployment of the scale experienced by South Africa 
could also have been avoided if young, unskilled job seekers could be absorbed into the informal 
sector.  The informal sector is the employer of last resort in most developing countries with 
institutionalized formal labor markets.  But while informal employment has grown quite rapidly 
in South Africa, informality still does not present the large footprint one would have expected it 
to have.  Informal employment (as a share of total non-agricultural employment) remains a 
fraction of what it is elsewhere in Africa, Latin America, and Asia (see Table 2). 
The reasons why informality does not play a larger role in absorbing surplus labor remain 
unclear.  One obvious candidate is the legacy of the Apartheid regime (and its pass laws in 
particular), which confined blacks who did not already have jobs to separate townships and 
prevented the unemployed from migrating into urban areas.  Restrictive zoning and licensing 
regulations and periodic “slum clearance” efforts undermined fledgling informal activities. Even 
though the pass laws themselves were repealed in 1986 and democracy itself is more than a 
decade old, it is possible that this history delayed the creation of the social and other networks 
needed to maintain large-scale informality.  (The burden of these pass laws and the difficulty of 
getting around them were immortalized in Athol Fugard’s hilarious play Sizwe Bansi is Dead   12
(1973), a passage from which is reproduced in the accompanying Box.) Another possibility is the 
prevalence of high levels of crime, which acts as a particularly onerous tax on small-scale 
 
Excerpt from Sizwe Bansi is Dead 
 
 
BUNTU. Listen…[reads]. ‘You are required to report to the Bantu Affairs Commissioner, King 
William’s Town, within three days of the above-mentioned date for the… .’  You should have 
been home yesterday!... ‘for the purpose of repatriation to home district.’  Influx Control. You’re 
in trouble, Sizwe. 
 
MAN. I don’t want to leave Port Elizabeth. 
 
BUNTU. Maybe.  But if that book says go, you go. 
 
MAN. Can’t I maybe burn this book and get a new one? 
 
BANTU. [sic] Burn that book?  Stop kidding yourself, Sizwe!  Anyway suppose you do.  You 
must immediately go apply for a new one.  Right?  And until that new one comes, be careful the 
police don’t stop you and ask for your book.  Into the Courtroom, brother.  Charge: Failing to 
produce Reference Book on Demand.  Five rand or five days.  Finally the new book comes.  
Down to the Labour Bureau for a stamp…it’s got to be endorsed with permission to be in this 
area.  White man at the Labour Bureau takes the book, looks at it—doesn’t look at you!—goes to 
the big machine and feeds in your number… 
[Buntu goes through the motions of punching out a number on a computer.] 
…card jumps out, he reads: ‘Sizwe Bansi.  Endorsed to King William’s Town…’  Takes your 
book, fetches that same stamp, and in it goes again.  So you burn that book, or throw it away, and 
get another one.  Same thing happens. 
[Buntu feeds the computer; the card jumps out.] 
‘Sizwe Bansi.  Endorsed to King William’s Town…’  Stamp goes in the third time… .  But this 
time it’s also into a van and off to the Native Commissioner’s Office; card around your neck 
with your number on it; escort on both sides and back to King William’s Town.  They make you 
pay for the train fare too! 
 
MAN. I think I will try to look for some jobs in the garden. 
 
BUNTU. You?  Job as a garden-boy?  Don’t you read the newspapers? 
 
MAN. I can’t read. 
 
BUNTU. I’ll tell you what the little white ladies say: ‘Domestic vacancies.  I want a garden-boy 
with good manners and a wide knowledge of seasons and flowers.  Book in order.’  Yours in   13
order?  Anyway what the hell do you know about seasons and flowers?  [After a moment’s 
thought.]  Do you know any white man who’s prepared to give you a job? 
 
MAN. No.  I don’t know any white men. 
 
BUNTU. Pity.  We might have been able to work something then.  You talk to the white man, 
you see, and ask him to write a letter saying he’s got a job for you.  You take that letter from the 
white man and go back to King William’s Town, where you show it to the Native Commissioner 
there.  The Native Commissioner in King William’s Town reads that letter from the white man in 
Port Elizabeth who is ready to give you the job.  He then writes a letter back to the Native 
Commissioner in Port Elizabeth.  So you come back here with the two letters.  Then the Native 
Commissioner in Port Elizabeth reads the letter from the Native Commissioner in King 
William’s Town together with the first letter from the white man who is prepared to give you a 
job, and he says when he reads the letters: Ah yes, this man Sizwe Bansi can get a job.  So the 
Native Commissioner in Port Elizabeth then writes a letter which you take with the two letters 
from the Native Commissioner in King William’s Town and the white man in Port Elizabeth, to 
the Senior Officer at the Labour Bureau, who reads all the letters.  Then he will put the right 
stamp in your book and give you another letter from himself which together with the letters from 
the white man and the two Native Affairs Commissioners, you take to the Administration Office 
here in New Brighton and make an application for Residence Permit, so that you don’t fall 
victim of raids again.  Simple. 
 
MAN. Maybe I can start a little business selling potatoes and… . 
 
BUNTU. Where do you get the potatoes and…? 
 
MAN. I’ll buy them. 
 
BUNTU. With what? 
 
MAN. Borrow some money… . 
 
BUNTU. Who is going to lend money to a somebody endorsed to hell and gone out in the bush?  
And how you going to buy your potatoes at the market without a Hawker’s Licence?  Same 
story, Sizwe.  You won’t get that because of the bloody stamp in your book. 
There’s no way out, Sizwe.  You’re not the first one who has tried to find it.  Take my advice and 
catch that train back to King William’s Town.  If you need work so bad go knock on the door of 
the Mines Recruiting Office.  Dig gold for the white man.  That’s the only time they don’t worry 




From Athol Fugard, Sizwe Bansi is Dead, New York, N.Y., 1986, pp. 24-26. 
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enterprises (Stone, forthcoming).  Finally, the existing system of social grants presumably sets a 
higher reservation wage level in South Africa than in comparable countries, acting as a deterrent 
to low-productivity informal activities (e.g. street peddling).   
 
IV. Explaining patterns of structural change       
  In this section, I present an analysis of the determinants of recent patterns of structural 
change in South Africa, paying particular attention to the manufacturing sector. As explained 
earlier, the health of the manufacturing sector is vital to both growth and employment creation in 
South Africa.  Understanding the lack of dynamism of this sector is therefore key to designing 
appropriate growth policies. 
  Formal employment in manufacturing has declined from 1.6 million in 1990 to 1.2 
million in 2004.  The fall in semi- and unskilled employment, from 1.0 million to 0.7 million, 
accounts for the bulk of this decline.  What is the reason for this adverse trend?  Figures 11, 12, 
13 and 14 display some of the candidate explanations.   
First, there has been an apparent fall in the relative price of the manufacturing sector.  
Figure 11 charts the relative price of manufacturing (value added price index of manufacturing 
divided by the GDP deflator) and shows that it tracks the behavior of manufacturing employment 
since the late 1970s quite well.  The decline in the relative price of manufacturing is of the order 
of 15 percent (if the GDP deflator is used as the denominator) and 50 percent (if the price of the 
F.I.R.E. sector [SIC 8] is used as the denominator).  When relative prices are adjusted by sectoral 
TFP growth (on the logic that a decline in output price can be offset by an increase in 
productivity), the relative profitability of manufacturing exhibits a decline of the order of 30 
percent (Figure 12).     15
  Second, the South African economy is now considerably more open to international trade 
and the manufacturing sector presumably faces much greater competitive discipline, regardless 
of whether firms are import-competing or export-oriented.  Edwards and Lawrence (2006) report 
a drop in the import-weighted effective rate of protection from 35.6 percent in 1989 to 14 percent 
in 2000.  As Figure 13 shows, import penetration levels have increased significantly within 
manufacturing, from an average of around 20 percent before 1990 to around 28 percent recently.  
Even though the work of Aghion, Braun, and Fedderke (2006) finds no evidence of decline in 
(average) markup ratios in South Africa, in view of the trade liberalization that has taken place to 
date it is difficult to believe that competitive pressure on manufacturing firms has not increased 
at the margin.  I will provide some evidence below which suggests that this increase in import 
competition is one of the reasons behind the decline in manufacturing’s relative price.   
  Third, we may consider the role played wage pressure.  South African data do not break 
down wages by skill category, but average real remuneration in manufacturing shows a steep 
increase in the 1990s (Figure 14).  Before we draw any conclusions from this, however, we need 
to bear in mind the trends in factor substitution that we discussed in the previous section:  
manufacturing has experienced both skill upgrading and capital deepening.  The average worker 
is now more skilled and has greater productivity because s/he works with more capital.  We have 
to explicitly control for this before we can ascribe employment decline to any element of wage-
push.  
 
Decomposing remuneration into skill-upgrading and wage-push components 
           We have data on total remuneration and skill composition of the workforce by sector.  
Therefore we can decompose changes in real sectoral remuneration into the following two   16
components: (a) a part that is due to purely to changes in skill composition; and (b) a part that 
represents the skill-adjusted wage (the residual).  I will call the first the “skill upgrading” 
component and the second the “wage push” component.  Specifically, I first run the following 
regression: 
  Log real remuneration =     α x (share of skilled) 
+   β x (share of highly-skilled) 
+   γ x (share of skilled) x (post-1990s dummy) 
+   δ x (share of highly-skilled) x (post-1990s dummy) 
The regression is run across nine one-digit sectors over the 1980-2004 period with a full set of 
year and sector dummies.  The results are shown in Table 3. The coefficients α and β represents 
our estimates of the skill premium (for skilled and highly-skilled workers, respectively, relative 
to semi and unskilled workers).  Both of these are positive and statistically significant as 
expected, with α < β.  The coefficients γ and δ are meant to capture a possible step increase in 
the economy-wide skill premium post-1990.  We find no such increase—in fact, the estimated 
values for γ and δ are negative, indicating a decline in the skill premium in the 1990s.  (The 
interpretation of these coefficients is clouded somewhat by the presence of year dummies in the 
specification.)       
  With these estimates in hand, we split the remuneration series into a component that is 
the part that is predicted according to the specification above, and a component that represents 
the skill-adjusted remuneration level (the residual).  In other words,  
  real remuneration = skill-upgrading (rem_pred) + wage push (rem_resid) 
 One problem with this decomposition is that skill-upgrading may not be exogenous, and may 
respond to wage push. Imagine, for example, that unions push the wages of low-skilled workers   17
above market-clearing levels. Then firms may respond by reducing the share of low-skilled 
employees in their workforce.  In such a scenario, the rise in real remuneration is fully the 
consequence wage push, even though the mechanical decomposition carried out here will 
suggest otherwise.  I will suggest below that this possibility is not quite consistent with the facts 
that we observe. 
  Figure 15 shows the trends in rem_pred and rem_resid for the manufacturing sector.  We 
see a striking contrast in the behavior of the two series.  Skill upgrading has been clearly an 
ongoing process since at least 1980.  But the skill-adjusted (residual) component of the real 
remuneration series exhibits a distinct fall during the 1990s compared to the 1980s.  In other 
words, once the effect of skill upgrading is taken out, labor costs in manufacturing appear to 
have become less onerous in the 1990s than they were in the 1980s.  This makes it very unlikely 
that wage-push factors can account for the reduction in manufacturing employment during the 
1990s—regardless of what one thinks of the level of labor costs in South Africa. 
  What of the possibility, mentioned previously, that skill upgrading itself is the 
consequence of a wage push?  Even if partly true, it is hard to square the evidence in the 
remuneration series with this hypothesis.  Note first that skill upgrading has been a steady and 
ongoing process—it does not just pick up in the 1990s.  It is not clear why manufacturing 
employment would start to decline only in the 1990s if this were the main story.  Second, a bit of 
economic theory helps.  Consider the comparative static exercise where we shock employment 
by an exogenous backward shift in the labor supply curve (a “wage push”).  If the series we 
observe in Figure 15 were the equilibrium responses to such a shock, we would expect to see an 
increase in skill upgrading (which we do see) and an increase in the residual (which we do not 
see).  For the initial wage push to result in a lower skill-adjusted wage level in the new   18
equilibrium, the labor demand curve would need to be positively sloped rather than negatively 
sloped.  For these reasons, it seems implausible that rising wage costs were themselves the 
original source of the decline in manufacturing employment.   
 
The econometrics of structural change    
         I posit that output and employment in each sector of the economy responds to the following 
economic determinants: 
•  relative prices, measured by each sector’s value added price index divided by the GDP 
deflator (lnp_pgdp) 
•  labor costs, measured by skill-adjusted real remuneration levels (lnrem_resid) 
•  skill-biased technological change, measured by the component of real remuneration that 
is “explained” by the skill composition of the workforce (lnrem_pred) 
•  total factor productivity growth (lnTFP). 
I then run panel regressions for the following three dependent variables: (i) output (value added); 
(ii) total employment; and (iii) semi and unskilled employment.  The panel consists of eight one-
digit sectors—I exclude SIC 9, government services—over the 1980-2004 period.  Each 
regression includes a full set of fixed effects for sectors and years.    
  Table 4 shows the results.  The first two rows display the estimated coefficients on 
relative prices, allowing a different coefficient for the manufacturing sector (by entering a 
separate term that is interacted with a dummy for manufacturing).  Where output is concerned, 
manufacturing shows no discernible difference from other sectors: a decrease in its relative 
prices reduces output in manufacturing by a virtually identical amount to that in other sectors on 
average.  But with respect to employment, there are strong differences. We find that both total   19
employment and unskilled employment is considerably more sensitive to changes in relative 
prices in manufacturing than they are elsewhere.  And the effect is quantitatively quite strong: a 
ten percent reduction in relative prices is associated with an equivalent decline in employment 
(of roughly 10 percent).   
  Second, we find that while skill upgrading and labor costs are not associated strongly 
with changes in output, they have powerful effects on employment.  Skill upgrading and skill-
adjusted labor costs both have the predicted, negative effects on employment, with the effect of 
skill upgrading particularly powerful on unskilled employment (which makes sense).  The 
elasticity of employment with respect to (skill-adjusted) labor costs is around -0.6 and is very 
tightly estimated. 
  Finally, we find that productivity growth has asymmetric effects on output and 
employment.  An increase in TFP boosts output (with an elasticity of 0.46) but reduces 
employment (with an elasticity of -0.19 for total employment and -0.21 for unskilled 
employment). 
  These results establish that patterns of structural change in South Africa can be 
understood within a parsimonious framework and using a relatively small number of economic 
determinants.  Since this exercise yields encouraging econometric results, I next ask how well 
this framework explains the decline in manufacturing employment since the democratic 
transition in 1994 specifically.  I do this by running a sector-level version of the specification in 
Table 4 (using data just from the manufacturing sector) and undertaking a “causal” 
decomposition of employment changes since 1994.  Note that the sectoral regression for 
manufacturing yields coefficient estimates that are very close to those obtained in the panel 
specification (see the coefficients reported in Table 5).  These regressions provide a remarkably   20
good fit for the actual trends in employment (see Figure 16, which plots actual and fitted 
employment series for total and unskilled employment in manufacturing).  Instrumental-
variables estimation (using the external terms of trade and real exchange rate as instruments for 
lnp_pgdp) also produces very similar results.    
  The results of the decomposition exercise are reported in Table 5.  Taking the 1980-90 
period as the base, the decade since 1994 has witnessed a 14 log-point decline in total 
manufacturing employment.  Meanwhile, relative prices for manufacturing have declined also by 
14 log-points, skill-adjusted wage costs have fallen by 36 log-points, remuneration costs due to 
the skill composition of the workforce have increased by 32 log-points, and TFP has increased 
by 9 points.  Applying these changes to the respective coefficient estimates for each explanatory 
variable, we get the causal decomposition reported at the bottom of the table. The bottom line 
that emerges is that the decline in relative price of manufacturing is the predominant cause of the 
fall in manufacturing employment.  In fact, this factor alone accounts for more than 100 percent 
of the employment reduction.   
Skill-biased technical change is the second most important contributor.  TFP growth turns 
out to have made a comparatively small contribution to the decline in employment (around 11 
percent), while the drop in skill-adjusted remuneration costs has operated in reverse, preventing 
manufacturing employment from falling even further.      
  In view of the starring role that the relative price of manufacturing plays in accounting 
for manufacturing’s misfortunes, it is worth pausing to ask how real the decline in this price is, 
and what has caused it in the first place.  I leave the second question to the next subsection, 
focusing here on the credibility of the fall of manufacturing’s relative profitability.  As I have 
discussed earlier, the decline in the terms of trade of manufacturing shows up in a variety of   21
relative prices—including TFP-adjusted relative prices.  Another comforting piece of evidence is 
that, as I will show below, standard economic variables do a reasonable job of explaining 
manufacturing’s relative price, although a significant component of the decline remains 
unaccounted (attributed to a simple time trend).  But a somewhat contradictory finding, reported 
by Aghion, Braun, and Fedderke (2006), is that markups in South African manufacturing are 
both high by international standards and have refused to come down since the 1990s.  Indeed, 
gross operating surplus ratios in manufacturing (per unit of capital or as a share of value added) 
seem to have, if anything, increased over time.
4  But there are reasons to worry about what these 
“markup” rates are measuring.  One telling indicator is that measured markups rose significantly 
in footwear during the 1990s—a sector that epitomizes hard times due to intense import 
competition from low-wage countries.  In addition, there seems to have been even more striking 
increases in markup rates in sectors other than manufacturing.  When one compares markups in 
manufacturing to those in, say, F.I.R.E., we observe a definite trend against manufacturing after 
1990 (Figure 17).  Indeed, if we take as our index of relative profitability the ratio of markups in 
manufacturing to markups in F.I.R.E., the trend that we observe is virtually identical to that when 
we use value-added prices (see Figure 17).   
In sum, while measured markup rates throw out some important puzzles, the picture that 
one obtains after considering these various indicators is a consistent one: a post-1994 investor—
domestic or foreign—considering an investment in South Africa would have been far less likely 
(than s/he would have been in the 1980s) to commit resources to manufacturing, compared to 
banking, insurance, or other services oriented towards the home market.                
 
                                                 
4 These data come from the same TIPS data base as the labor and output statistics used above.  Aghion et al. use 
additional data sources from UNIDO and published company balance sheets in their international comparisons.   22
Understanding the decline in manufacturing’s relative price 
  Why did relative profitability in manufacturing decline in the 1990s?  As discussed 
earlier, one candidate is intensified import competition.  But other factors, including the real 
exchange rate and the terms of trade, may have played a role as well.  Table 7 presents the results 
of an econometric attempt to model the behavior of manufacturing’s relative price.  The 
independent variables included are the terms of trade, the real exchange rate, import penetration, 
and a time trend.  The dependent variable is the (log of the) value-added price of manufacturing 
divided by the GDP deflator (lnp_pgdp).  As Figure 18 shows, the model does a decent job of 
tracking the in-sample behavior of this relative price and its decline over time.  As expected, 
import penetration enters with a negative and statistically significant coefficient. The estimated 
coefficient on the real exchange rate is negative and significant as well, indicating that a real 
appreciation worsens the relative profitability of manufacturing (with an elasticity of 0.1).  To 
the extent that the real exchange rate approximates the price of non-tradables relative to 
tradables, the inverse relationship between the real exchange rate and manufacturing’s relative 
price reflects the fact that manufactures are the quintessential tradables.  The econometrics 
confirm that the level (and also presumably the volatility) of the real exchange rate is a 
significant determinant of the health of manufacturing.  The external terms of trade do not enter 
significantly, but that could well be the result of the fact that we are controlling for the real 
exchange rate separately.  Since South Africa is a natural resource exporter, the main channel 
through which the terms of trade affects the relative profitability of manufacturing would be 
through the real exchange rate.  Finally, the regression indicates that there is a strong downward 
time trend in manufacturing’s relative price even after we control for these other influences.             23
  Table 8 reports the results of a decomposition exercise using the regression coefficients 
just discussed.  Once again, we compare the decade after 1994 with the baseline of 1980-90.  The 
relative price of manufacturing has declined by 14 log-points between these two periods.  The 
main message that comes across from the decomposition is that the bulk of this decline is 
“explained” by the time trend—i.e., remains unexplained by the economic determinants included 
in the regression.  Import competition itself accounts for about a quarter of the decline in 
profitability.  The real exchange rate, which stood at a more depreciated level post-1994, makes a 
positive contribution to manufacturing’s relative profitability.  In fact, the depreciation of the real 
exchange rate seems to have offset about four-fifths of the adverse effect of import competition.  
A more depreciated exchange rate presumably would have been even better for the health of 
manufacturing.   
  In order to examine the effect of international trade on manufactures more closely, I have 
also looked at the relationship between imports and export ratios and relative output prices across 
twenty-eight individual manufacturing subsectors (in a fixed effects framework with year and 
subsector dummies).  I find that an increase in import penetration has a strong negative effect on 
a manufacturing subsector’s relative price, while an increase in exports has a less strong but still 
statistically significant positive effect (Table 9, col. 1).  These results confirm at a more 
disaggregated level that manufacturing’s profitability is strongly linked to trade competition and 
performance.  They also confirm that the causality runs from trade to prices, rather than vice 
versa. (If higher import penetration were the result of higher prices charged by domestic 
suppliers, the correlation between imports and prices would be positive rather than negative.)  
Looking at employment consequences across manufacturing subsectors directly, we similarly   24
find that import penetration has adverse effects on employment while exports have a positive 
effect (Table 9, col. 2).
5  
  But what do we make of the large unexplained time trend in manufacturing’s relative 
profitability?  My speculative answer is that the simple regression model above does a poor job 
of capturing the full effect of trade openness and globalization on manufacturing profitability.  
Caught between more advanced countries at the high end and China at the low end, it seems safe 
to assume that South African producers have had a rough ride during the 1990s. 
 
V.  Concluding remarks 
The disappointing growth and employment trajectory of the South African economy 
since its democratic transition is best understood as a consequence of the under-performance of 
its non-resource tradables sector, and of manufacturing in particular.  Had the South African 
manufacturing sector expanded rapidly, economic growth would have been higher and far more 
jobs would have been created for the relatively unskilled.  The good news is that the objectives 
of macroeconomic stability, economic growth, and social equity all require the same 
fundamental structural shift in the South African economy: an expanded non-resource tradables 
sector.   
As I have shown in this paper, the behavior of South Africa’s manufacturing sector is 
well explained by standard economic determinants.  Prices, costs, and productivity are the main 
drivers of manufacturing production and employment.  Therefore putting manufacturing on a 
permanently steeper trajectory will necessitate working on these same levers.  In particular, it 
                                                 
5 It is the case that the trade-induced decline in manufacturing employment has been partially offset by an increase 
in employment in trade-related services, particularly wholesale and retail trade (SIC 6).  But since wholesale and 
retail trade is considerably more skill intensive compared to manufacturing, the net job loss for unskilled workers 
has still been considerable.    25
will require reversing the decline in relative profitability which the econometrics tells us has 
been the primary culprit for the sector’s misfortunes.     26
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A snapshot in 1988 (US=1)




ZAF 0.25 0.959 0.568 0.46 0.111
MYS 0.267 1.004 0.592 0.45 0.103
Source: Hall and Jones (1999)  31
Figure 3 
 






































































































































































Note:  This measure of the sophistication of export baskets comes from Hausmann et al. (2006).  
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Box 1: Malaysian policies to promote manufacturing 
 
 
•  Early 1970s: EPZs combined with restrictions on unionism to attract 
MNEs 
•  Early 1980s: heavy industrialization strategy focusing on trade 
protection, bumiputera-ownership, and public enterprise 
•  Recession in mid-1980s, followed by privatization 
•  Late 1980s: trade liberalization plus substantial incentives to 
investment and exports (including on “priority products”) 
–  Very little rise in skill intensity, even though manufacturing takes off 
•  Early 1990s: Focus on training and skills 
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Figure 7 
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Change in employment versus initial low-skill intensity, by manufacturing subsectors, 1970-
2004 (annual average percent changes)
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Figure 10 
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Source: Charmes (2000) via Kingdon and Knight (2003)   41
Figure 11 






























































































































































Manufacturing employment Rleative price of manufacturing  42
Figure 12 























































































































































Relative to GDP deflator Relative to financial intermediation, real estate and business services  43
Figure 13 
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Figure 14 
   
 
 

































































































































































   α  β  γ  δ 
coeff. 4.36  11.64  -0.51  -2.59 
t-stat 4.76  10.33  -2.98  -4.21 
 
Estimated across nine 1-digit industries over 1980-2004, with a full set of year 












































































































































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
skill upgrading  
(rem_predicted) 
“wage push” 





Estimated across eight 1-digit industries (excluding government employment) 





lnp_pgdp 0.35 0.21 -0.21
4.45 1.74 -2.04
lnp_pgdp x 
manufacturing -0.04 1.24 1.12
-0.13 2.67 2.77
lnrem_resid -0.02 -0.62 -0.61
-0.34 -8.75 -9.72
lnrem_pred 0.04 -0.35 -0.59
1.04 -5.56 -10.85
ln TFP 0.46 -0.19 -0.21
8.52 -2.26 -2.92
N 200 200 200







Explanatory variables used to generate the fitted values are: lnp_pgdp, lnrem_resid, lnrem_pred, lntfp. 






































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
Fitted values lnl_un  49






ln l lnp_pgdp lnrem_residual lnrem_predicted lntfp total
1980-1990 14.24 0.17 0.15 10.77 4.48
1994-2004 14.09 0.02 -0.11 11.10 4.57
log-points diff  -0.14 -0.14 -0.26 0.32 0.09
coefficient 1.445 -0.624 -0.347 -0.187
contribution -0.21 0.16 -0.11 -0.02 -0.17
(percent) 143.8% -113.0% 78.2% 11.2% 120.2%
Due to:  50
Figure 17 
 
Profitability of manufacturing (SIC 3) relative to F.I.R.E. (SIC 8)
































































































































































ln TOT ln RER
import 
penetration time
estimated coefficient 0.09 -0.1 -0.006 -0.009
t-stat 1.03 -2.5 -2.72 -5.73
R-sq 0.92














1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
Fitted values lnp_pgdp  53
Table 8 
 
Relative price of manufacturing
lnp_pgdp lntot_imf lnrer imp time total
1980-1990 0.17 0.15 4.93 19.94 1985
1994-2004 0.02 0.06 4.65 26.31 1999
log-points diff  -0.14 -0.09 -0.28 6.37 14.00
coefficient 0.09 -0.10 -0.01 -0.01
contribution -0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.12 -0.14
(percent) 5.6% -19.6% 25.3% 83.5% 94.8%
Due to:  54
Table 9 
Fixed effects regressions across manufacturing subsectors 
        
  dependent variable:     
 lnp_pgdp  ln  employment     
 (1)  (2)     
        
import penetration  -0.003 -0.008     
  -4.18 -5.58     
        
export ratio  0.002 0.006     
  2.80 4.73     
        
lnrem_resid   -0.289     
   -7.76     
        
lnrem_pred   -0.663     
   -5.11     
        
lntfp   -0.001     
   -0.03     
        
N  980 700     
        
Estimated with a full set of year and subsector dummies across 28 manufacturing 
subsectors 
over the periods 1970-2004 (col. 1) and 1980-2004 (col. 2).     
T-stats are shown under the coefficients.       
 
 